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negligence to persist and go to the jury, and the bailee must produce
enough evidence that he was not negligent to convince the jury of that
fact. 6 If we say that the amount of evidence necessary is just enough
to counterbalance the presumption, we are still within the limits of the
dogma that the burden of persuasion does not shift from the bailor;
if we say that to produce enough evidence to convince the jury that
there was no negligence does actually shift the burden of persuasion, it
would seem that in equity no violence has been done, since the bailee
having knowledge of all the circumstances should be able to show that
he was not negligent if, in fact, he were not. D. R. T.
INSURANCE
INTERIM INSURANCE ARISING FROM ISSUANCE OF PRELIMINARY
RECEIPT
Twenty days before his death, Dell B. Duncan, deceased husband
of the plaintiff,' applied in writing for a life insurance policy with the
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, paid an advance
premium of one dollar and designated the plaintiff, his wife, as bene-
ficiary. The insurance company was investigating the applicant's occu-
pation at the time of his death, but had taken no other action on the
application, either by way of acceptance or rejection. In her suit to
collect the amount of insurance applied for ($720.00), the plaintiff
contended that the provisions of a preliminary receipt2 issued at the time
of the application created a present contract of interim or temporary
insurance.
The Supreme Court of Ohio construed the receipt' as providing
temporary protection commencing immediately upon the signing of the
application and payment of the premium. This interim insurance was
to continue until such time as the insurer had considered the application
and announced its determination to accept or reject the risk. One clause
" Morgan, Instructing the Jury upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof (1933) 4.7
HARv. L. REV. 59.
'Duncan v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 137 Ohio St. 44 (940).
'The receipt issued by the insurer provided that "it is understood and agreed that no
liability is assumed by the company on account of this payment nor until it shall issue a
policy, but if death occurs after the date of the application from which this receipt is
detached and prior to the date of issue of such policy, payment in accordance with and
subject to the conditions and provisions of the policy applied for shall be made; provided
the applicant is insurable under the company's rules and the application is approved and
accepted by it at its home offices as to plan, premium and amount of insurance. If a policy
is issued, the deposit will be applied to payment of the premiums thereon from its date,
otherwise the deposit will be returned to the payer thereof upon surrender of this receipt."
3 Ibid.
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in the receipt stated "but if death occurs after the date of the application
. . . and prior to the date of issue of such policy, payment . . . shall
be made; .. ." Immediately following the semicolon was another clause
which described the further conditions under which the liability of the
carrier was to attach.4 The court reasoned that "the words 'after the
date of the application' were intended to have some meaning and bind-
ing force and effect" and if it were the intention of the parties that
liability of the insurer would arise only after approval and acceptance
of the application, then language to that effect should have been used.'
Pending investigation of the risk and consideration of the application
by the home office of the life insurance company a necessary delay or
period exists between the signing of the application and the delivery
of the policy. This interval is a potential source of loss to the life
insurance carrier. A decision by the applicant to buy from another
company or not to carry any insurance at all during this period may
result in a loss to the company to the amount expended for the solicita-
tion, investigation and medical examination of the applicant.6 To mini-
mize this loss7 it is the practice of most life insurance companies to induce
applicants to pay all or part of their first premium, either in cash or in
the form of some credit transaction, at the time of the application.' In
exchange for the initial payment a printed form containing a special
receipt is given to the applicant. Such receipts are known in the insur-
ance business as conditional receipts or as conditional binding receipts.'
"Most binding receipts provide that the insurance is to be effective
immediately, subject to certain conditions. Either the approval of the
application at the home office is made the condition, or it is stated that
the company must be satisfied that the applicant was an insurable risk
on the date of the application. Another form makes the insurance
effective if the applicant is, in the opinion of the company, an insurable
risk on the date of the receipt and the application is otherwise acceptable
on the plan for the amount applied for. Occaionally distinctions are
drawn based on the exact language of the receipt but for the most part
courts have avoided such refinements."' °
'Supra, note z.
'Supra, note i, at 447.
'Comment (1935) 44 YA.E L. J. 1223.
71 d. at x=24: ". . . the prospects of a law suit to affect repayment . . . provides
sufficient deterrent to a revocation."
'In TVheclock v. Clark, zi .Vyo. 300, 131 Pac. 35 (913), a note was given for
the first premium of a life insurance policy. Prior to acceptance of the application the
applicant notified the insurer to cancel the policy and return the note. Subsequent to such
notice a policy was tendered to the applicant but refused by him. In a suit to recover
on the note by the general agent of the insurer recovery was denied. See Travis v.
Nederland Life Ins. Co., io4 Fed. 4 86, at 488 (C.C.A. 8th, '9oo).
" 8 7 A.L.R. 332, at 333-
. Comment (938) 33 ILL. L. RFv. i8o, at I8z. (Italics added).
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Due largely to the fact that the agent's authority and the particular
facts of each case vary, the reported decisions are not in accord as to
the effect of such receipts on the legal relations of the parties during
the period between the issuance of the receipt and the approval of the
policy at the home office." Writers on the subject are not in complete
agreement as to the name by which these receipts should be called. One
author says that they are "conditional receipts" and it is incorrect to
recognize them as "binding receipts."'" Other writers, however, consis-
tently maintain that such acknowledgments are known in the insurance
business as "binding receipts."' 3 To add to the confusion some courts
have said "binding receipts" in the strict sense of the term'4 are not
ordinarily issued by life insurance companies."
It is held by a group of courts that as a matter of law these instru-
ments are ineffectual in providing protection to the applicant until the
application is approved or accepted. 6 Many of the cases on this point
regard the application or receipt as a mere proposal to become insured
by the carrier, i.e., as an offer'" by the applicant for a contract of insur-
ance, which like any other offer does not become a contract until
accepted during the lifetime of the offeror.'" Some courts, perhaps feel-
ing that the language of the receipt or application is inconclusive standing
n I Coucn ON INSURANCE, sec. 9 i, p. 164.
"2 MACLEAN, LIFE INSURANCE (5th ed. 1939) 514.
"3PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW (ist ed. 1935) sec 2o; VANCE, IN-
SURANCE (zd ed. 1930) sec. 66.
'
4 According to Vance, (2d ed. 1930) p. 194, "the binding slip is merely a written
memorandum of the most important terms of a preliminary contract of insurance, intended
to give temporary protection pending the investigation of the risk by the insurer, or until
the issue of a formal policy. By intendment it is subject to all the conditions in the policy
to be issued." Where, however, the receipt or binding slip is conditional upon the accep-
tance of the application by the insurer, a "looser" construction or interpretation of the
receipt may be possible. See 29 Am. JUR. sec. 144.
"Ann. Cas. z93SB, 652, at 657.
8o 1t A.L.R. 332; 107 A.L.R. 194; Ann. Cas. 1915B 652, at 657-
'Where application is accompanied by a cash payment of the premium, it is an
offer to make a unilateral contract, as the act of payment is to be exchanged for the in-
surer's promise of coverage. Where application is accompanied by a promissory note or
even an oral promise of the insured, an application accompanied by such promise is an
offer to make a bilateral contract. Where no oral promise, note or cash accompanied the
application, it is merely an invitation to an offer. PATTERSON, ESSFN71ALS OF INSURANCE
LAW (ist ed. 1935) sec. 13, p. 5.
'Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Young, 23 Wall. (9o U.S.) 85, at 107, 23 L.Ed. ISz
(1875)i Paine v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 51 Fed. 689, at 691 (C.C.A. 8th, I89z);
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Neafus, 345 Ky. 563, syl. 3, 34o S.W. ioz6 (sgi);
Olson v. American Central Life Ins. Co., 172 Minn. Sri, at 533, z16 NAV. 2Z2 (19Z7);
Muhlbach v. Omaha Life Ins. Co. of Omaha, 107 Neb. 2o6, 185 N.W. 447 (sgzi);
Beaty v. Southland Life Ins. Co., 28 S.W. (zd) 895, at 898 (Tex. Civ. App. 3930);
Gonsoulin v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc., 152 La. 865, 94 So. 424, at 427 (39zz); Kennedy
v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 205 Fed. 677, at 678 (1913); see Wheelock v. Clark, z
Wyo. 300, at 307, 13 Pac. 35 (1913); Steinle v. New York Life Ins. Co., 81 Fed. 489
(C.C.A. 5th, 1897).
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alone,"0 reason that the death of the applicant before his application is
accepted revokes the offer to become insured2" or "that the death of the
subject of insurance renders the making of the proposed contract
impossible."'" Reaching substantially the same result and using sub-
stantially the same language as the previous cases referred to, some
courts have construed these "binding receipts" to be either "conditional
or qualified acceptances depending upon approval by the home office
of the insurer"2 2 or to be "agreements to insure at some future time,
to wit, on approval of the application."2
The leading case of Insurance Company v. Young 24 is cited by
later decisions" for the proposition that the receipt "reserves the absolute
right to the company to reject or accept the proposition which it con-
tained . . .and that the entire subject is both affirmatively and nega-
tively within its choice and discretion." 26 Some state courts, however,
have felt that the company "cannot arbitrarily or unreasonably reject
or withhold its approval, and thereby avoid its liability, under the clause
in the binding slip requiring the approval of the application . . .by the
company before the insurance shall take effect."2
The receipt in the case of Muhlbach v. Omaha Life Insurance
Con pany2" contained a promise to return the entire amount of premium
paid, "if the policy as applied for shall not be issued." The court held
that because of this proviso "no consideration whatever remained for
insurance of a temporary nature during the time intervening between
the date of the application and the approval or rejection of the risk. . .
'Sapra, note 6, at 226.
"' Paine v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 5i Fed. 689 (C.C.A. 8th 1892) Braman v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 73 F. (2d) 391 (C.C.A. 8th, 1934)i Cooksey v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 73 Ark. 117, 83 SAV. 317 (1904); Field v. Missouri Life Ins. Co.,
77 Utah 4s, at 56, 290 S.W. 979 (930)i Gonsoulin v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc. s5z La.
S6S, 94 So. 424 (1922).
"'Paine v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 51 Fed. 689 (C.C.A. 8th, 5892); See Bra-
man v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 73 F. (zd) 391 (C.C.A. 8th, 1934-).
'Hughes v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 297 N.Y.S. ss6, at izz (2937).
Accord, Mohrstadt v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., zIS Fed. 8z (C.C.A. 8th, 2902).
" Braman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 73 F. (2d) 391, at 396 (C.C.A. 8th, 2935).
"23 Wall. (90 U.S.) 85, 23 L.Ed. 252 (i874). Supra, note 18.
LMohrstadt v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., ixi Fed. 81, at 82 (C.C.A. 8th,
1902); Hughes v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 297 N.Y.S. 116, at 23 (1937).
2] Supra, note 25, at so6.
' Gardner v. North State Mutual Life Ins. Co., 163 N.C. 367, 79 S.E. 8o6, at 8o8,
48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 74, Ann. Cas. sgisB 652;5 Cf. Grier v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y.,
132 N.C. 542, 44 S.E. 28 (2903). The receipt in the case of Reynolds v. Northwestern
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 189 Iowa 76, 176 NAV. 207 (i92o) permitted the insurer to reject
the application if it was not "satisfied" as to the applicant's insurability as of the date
of the medical examination. The distinction between "satisfaction" and "approval" was
not accepted in Gerib v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 256 111. App. So6 (930).
0 1 7 Neb. 206, x8S NAV. 447 (19Z). Contra, Albers v. Security Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 4z S.D. 270, 170 NAV. 59 (x958), cited infra, note 48.
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There is a group of cases in which the company did not accept or
reject the application but forwarded a policy which departed from or
modified the terms of the application or receipt.2" It has been uniformly
held that the issuance of the revised policy does not constitute an accept-
ance of the applicant's offer or proposal to become insured but is a
counter offer which must be accepted by the insured during his lifetime
in order to become binding upon the parties."
The general purport of the cases reviewed thus far is that the
approval or acceptance of the application by the insurer during the.
lifetime of the applicant is a condition precedent to be performed before
the liability of the insurer arises." It appears, therefore, that the binding
slip does not insure of itself and does not operate as a present contract
of insurance effective in case of the death of the applicant pending action
on his application.32 The only vitality given to the binding slips by these
courts is retroactively derived from an approval of the application and
where the application is not accepted, the binding receipt ceases eo in-
stanti to have any effect.33
Some courts, however, have viewed the provisions of the application
or the binder as conditions subsequent requiring affirmative action by the
insurer to avoid liability upon the interim receipt.34 These decisions
allowed the beneficiaries to recover regardless of the ultimate action of
the carrier. According to these courts it is the "intention of the parties"
to effect interim or temporary insurance for that period of time between
the making of the application and its approval or rejection by the com-
pany. The elements establishing the intention of the parties may be
gathered from the wording of the receipt, the payment of the premium,
the reasons for such receipts and the reasonable inferences to be drawn
from their issuance.
'Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Young, 23 Wall. (90 U.S.) 85, 23 L.Ed. x5z (i874);
State ex iel. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S. v. Robertson, igx S.V. 989 (Mo. 9x6);
Gorning v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, z88 N.Y.S. 661, 8 N.E. (zd) 338 (1937);
Mohrstadt v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., ii5 Fed. 8z (C.C.A. 8th, 19oz).
soIbid.
'Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Young, z3 Wall. (90 U.S.) 85, 23 L.Ed. 252 (1874.);
Braman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 73 F. (zd) 391 (C.C.A. 8th, 1935); Cooksey
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 73 Ark. 117, 83 S.W. 327 (1904); Northwestern Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Neafus, 145 Ky. 563, 140 S.W. 1oz6 (igii); Olson v. American Central
Life Ins. Co., 172 Minn. 52i, 226 N.W. zz5 (19z7).
'See Grier v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 13z N.C. 542, 44 S.E. 29 (1903);
Gardner v. North State Mutual Life Ins. Co., 263 N. C. 367, 79 S.E. 8o6 (1913).
3 Ibid.
"Starr v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 41 Wash. 228, 83 Pac. 116 (29o); Hart v.
Travelers' Ins. Co., 236 App. Div. 309, 742, z58 N.Y.S. 711, afl'd, 262 N.Y. 563, 185
N.E. 739 (2933); Buono v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 74 App. Div. 898, z67
N.Y.S. 972 (933); Howard v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, iS Ohio L. Abs. 688
(1935)i Stonsz v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 324 Pa. 97, 187 AUt. 403 (1936); Albers
v. Security Mutual Life Ins. Co., 41 S.D. 270, 17o N.W. 159 (2928).
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In Starr v. Mutual Life Insurance Company3" it was held that a
receipt containing the words "policy to take effect from date" effected
a contract of present insurance and prevailed over provisions in the
application that it should so operate only in the event of its acceptance."
This holding constitutes a dear repudiation of the view that the applica-
tion and binding receipt merely evidence an offer." In two New York
cases" the receipt evidencing payment contained two clauses: the first
clause standing alone and unqualified provided the insurance was effective
from the date of the application; the condition of approval or acceptance
was found in a second clause, separate from and independent of the first
clause. The New York court in both instances considered the termin-
ology of the conditional receipt involved ambiguous. Since all doubts
and ambiguities are resolved in favor of the applicant or insured,3" the
beneficiaries recovered the face value of the policies. A similar approach
was adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in the Duncan case."0 The
wording of the binding receipt in the case of Stonsz v. Equitable Life
.dssurance Society" was used to make the insurer liable on a policy
containing terms different from those in the application. Although this
was a case where the plaintiff suffered injuries resulting in his total
disability pending action by the carrier on his application rather than one
where the applicant for insurance died before delivery of the policy,
"the opinion is significant as indicating the judicial attitude toward
binding receipts,"'' r i.e., "as binding during the interim regardless of the
ultimate action of the carrier.""
L41 Wash, 228, 33 Pac. 116 (i9o).
' The court indicated, however, that it would have held there was no contract of
insurance unless the application had been approved and a policy issued during the lifetime
of the insured "if the receipt issued . . . contained the same provision as the application
." See 41 Wash. zZ, at 231, 83 Pac. ss6, at 117.7 Supra, note I a, at I 84-
" Hart v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 236 App. Div. 309, 742, 258 N.Y.S. 711, aff'd z61
N.Y. 563, x85 N.E. 739 (1939)i Buono v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 74- App. Div.
S98, 267 N.Y.S. 972 (1933).
-'See Mr. Justice Maxey, dissenting in Stonsz v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 324 Pa.
97, at 124, 187 At. 403, at 415 (1936), isfra, note 41, where he criticizes the major-
ity's holding in regard to the legal effect of the binding receipt involved by the following
excerpt: "In a number of cases elsewhere, the court created the 'doubt' by a species of
argument which would not be tolerated in any other kind of contract, and then, having
thus found the 'doubt,' resolved it in favor of the insured."
" Supra, note I.
41324 Pa. 97, 187 At. 404, 107 A.L.R. 178 (1937). This decision has been
the subject of some criticism for extending the rule that insurance contracts should be
construed against the insurer "to a point where the elementary principles of contract are
disturbed." 14 N.Y.U. L.Q. REv. 396. More comments or criticisms may be found in 33
ILL. L. REv. z8o, supra, note IO ZZ IOWA L. REv. 58S; 3 U. oF PITr. L. R~v. 699.
' Supra, note So, at x8S.




The fact that the applicant paid the first premium when a binding
receipt was delivered to him has been stressed in all of these opinions.
These courts reason that by the payment of the premium for one year
the insured is entitled to insurance for one year and that a rule rendering
the receipt ineffective as evidence of a present contract of insurance oper-
ates harshly in that the insured is paying for insurance for a period during
which he is not insured at all. Since the insured should pay only for
the protection he actually receives, his first payment would be payable
only on the date that his protection commences.
The minority jurisdictions conclude that if there is to be no contract
of insurance until the application is approved, then the chief object or
reason for the issuance of such receipt is to enable the company to
collect premiums for a period during which there is no risk to the
company." The receipt is said undoubtedly to provide an inducement
for the payment of the first premium45 making funds available to the
insurer to use and invest in addition to securing, for all practical purposes,
a definite customer rather than an intangible prospect.4"
The jurisdictions which require affirmative action by the insurer
to divest itself of liability assume that the only reasonable inference to be
drawn from the issuance of the binding receipt is that the parties intended
to provide interim insurance to the applicant." The receipt involved in
the case of Albers v. Security Mutual Life Insurance Company"4 con-
tained a proviso that the applicant could not withdraw his applicataion
and was obligated to pay the first premium even if he decided not to take
the insurance before the company approved. The Court held that the
parties intended to create a present contract of temporary insurance or
else there could be no consideration for the proviso, prepayment of the
premium or antedating of the policy. Other courts have reasoned that
if the language of the receipt means "that no protection is afforded at all,
then the language is meaningless" 49 and the receipt is a nullity.5" "If the
insured had lived until the application was approved and a policy issued,
it would be immaterial to him if the contract related back and whether
he was insured in the interim. On the other hand, if he died before the
application was approved, there would be no advantage to him in paying
his premium in advance and his beneficiary would derive no benefit
from the insurance."'" L.S.F.
SSupra, note 35.
"Hart v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 236 App. Div. 309, 742, z58 N.Y.S. 711, aff'd z61
N.Y. S63, x85 N.E. 739 (1939).
" Stonsz v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. 324 Pa. 97, z87 Ad. 403 (1936).
17 Howard v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, iS Ohio L. Abs. 688 (1935).
484.1 S.D. 270, 17o N.W. 559 (1918).
"Supra, note 47, at 691.
tSupra, note 46.
mSupra, note 35-
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INSURANCE - DEATH OR INJURY BY "ACCIDENTAL MEANS"
The insured administered to himself an enema by attaching a rubber
tube to the faucets of a bathtub, intending to control the water pressure
by turning the water faucet, but the pressure of the water caused the
insured o suffer a ruptured sigmoid from which he died several hours
later. In an action brought by the beneficiary named in deceased's life
insurance policy against the New York Life Insurance Company, the
Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Court of Appeals of Franklin
County, holding that such death was not effected by accidental means
within the meaning of the policy which provided for double indemnity
if the death of the insured "resulted directly and independently of all
other causes from bodily injury effected solely through external, violent
and accidental means."'
Under the older policies which insured against "accidental death"
or "accidental injury," recovery could be had upon showing that the
resulting death or injury was unforseen, unexpected, or unusual.2 But
the clauses contained in the modern policies, as is the case here, insure
against death or injury due to "external, violent or accidental means."
Some of the cases have permitted recovery here as though the "acci-
dental death" or "accidental injury" clause had not been changed;'
while in the more strictly construed cases, the plaintiff has not prevailed
unless he has shown that something unforseen, unexpected or unusual
occurred in the act preceding the injury, it making no difference that
the result was unforseen, unexpected or unusual.4 In the often quoted
case of United States Mutual 1ccident Association v. Barry 5 the Su-
preme Court of the United States approved a charge to the effect that
if the act preceding the injury was carried out in the exact manner as
intended by the insured, regardless of the fact that the result was unfor-
seen, unexpected or unusual, the injury would not be by accidental
means. The Court then set forth a test for "accidental means"6 which
a Mitchell v. New York Life Insurance Company, 136 Ohio St. SSI, 27 N.E. (2d)
243, 17 Ohio Op. 229 (1940)5 reversing 6z Ohio App. 54, 28 Ohio L. Abs. 653, x5 Ohio
Op. 406 (j939).
-Pledger v. Business Men's Accident Association of Texas, 197 SAV. 889 (Texas
Civ. App. 1917)i Francis v. International Association, z6o S.w. 938 (Texas Civ. App.
19z6)aEhley v. Fidelity & C. Co., X37 Ind. 447, L.R.A. 19i8F, 646, 72o N.E. 42 (1918);
Continental Casualty Company v. Bruden, 178 Ark. 683, 11 S.W. (2d) 493, 6z A.L.R.
1192 (1 9 ,8).
'Landrecs v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company, 291 U.S. 491, aS L.Ed.
934, 54 Sup. Ct. 461 (1933)-&131 U.S. 100, 33 L.Ed. 6o, 9 Sup. Ct. 755 (1889).
rId. at xz "If a result is such as follows from ordinary means, voluntarily em-
ployed, in a not unusual or unexpected way, it cannot be called a result effected by
accidental means- but if, in the act which precedes the injury, something unforeseen,
unexpected, unusual, occurs which produces the injury, then the injury has resulted
through accidental means."
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has been subject to such varying interpretations that the decisions are
now in a state of hopeless conflict.' Speaking of this situation, the late
Justice Cardozo said: "The attempted distinction between accidental
results and accidental means will plunge this branch of the law into a
Serbonian Bog."
Nor has Ohio escaped from the reaches of this "Serbonian Bog."
Injury and death by freezing have been held to be within the protection
of the "accidental means" clause;8 while a death from heart dilation
resulting from a cold bath has been held to be beyond the coverage of
such clause.9 Death from drownings have been declared actionable
under the "accidental means" provision;'" while recovery was denied
under the clause where the insured died of amoebic dysentery resulting
from taking a drink of water which had unknowingly been contami-
nated by a break in the hotel sewer pipe." Thus, we see that opposite
results have been reached in decisions based on factual circumstances of
marked similarity. This conflict can only be explained by observing the
tests for "accidental means" applied by the courts. In the Wheeler case,
the court applied the more liberal view, saying that as "the result (death
by freezing) was wholly unexpected and did not follow as 'the usual
effect of a known cause' " the death was by accidental means. But
"accidental means" was more strictly construed in New 4msterdam
Casualty Company v. Johnson," where the court held that since the
voluntary act of taking a cold bath was carried out in the exact manner
as intended by the insured, the unanticipated dilation of the heart would
not be death by accidental means.
In the case at bar, both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
applied the strict test by looking at the act to see if it was accidental,
and yet they arrived at different conclusions. The Court of Appeals
stressed the fact that the act, which they considered to be the non-
exercise of control by the insured, was unusual and unintended, and
hence accidental. The Supreme Court said that the evidence did not
show anything unexpected or unusual in the act, which they thought
" In the case of sunstroke there is a marked split of opinion; cf. Landress v.
Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra, note 4, with O'Connell v. New York Life Insurance
Co., zzo Wis. 61, 264. N.W. 253 (1936); and see 17 A.L.R. 1197.
8Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Patrick, 78 Ohio App. 267, 16z N.E. 68o, 6 Ohio L. Abs.
168 (z927); Commonwealth Casualty Co. v. Wheeler, 13 Ohio App. 140, 30 Ohio C.C.
(N.s.) 257, 17 Ohio L. Rep. 304 (1919).
'New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Johnson, 91 Ohio St. iS5, iio N.E. 475, L.R.A.
i916B, soz8 (1914).
15Knickerbocker Casualty Ins. Co. v. Jordan, 6 Ohio Dec. Rep. 1x45, 1o Am.
L. Rec. 625 (x8z); United States Mutual Accident Association v. Hubbell, 56 Ohio St.
Sx6, 47 N.E. 544, 40 L.R.A. 453 (1897).
'Burns v. Employers' Liability Ass'n. Corp., 134 Ohio St. 222, 16 N.E. (zd) 316,
12 Ohio Op. 18, 117 A.L.R. 733, 26 Ohio L. Abs. 52 (1938).
2291 Ohio St. 155, x1o N.E. 475, L.R.A. sgs6B, sosS (z94.).
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was the water pressure, but that the act was done in the manner
intended, and consequently the unexpected result did not constitute "ac-
cidental means." The dissenting opinion emphasized the fact that in
view of the disastrous result, the act must not have been done in the
manner intended, and that the amount of the pressure was unforsee-
able, unexpected and unusual, and hence was the "accidental means."
When one looks to the distinction drawn by the Court of Appeals 3
between the case at bar and the New Zmsterdam case, he finds merit
in the contentions made by the Court of Appeals and the dissent in the
principal case. The Court of Appeals pointed out that in the New
AImsterdam case the insured did nothing but that which he intended to
do, while in the case at bar the act quite obviously was not done in the
manner intended. Such an interpretation of the principal case seems
to be in conformity with the holding in the key case of United States
M1utual Accident dssociation v. Barry. D. A. W.
LABOR LAW
THE NATURE OF A STRIKE
The term "strike" is as old as organized labor. The problem of
defining it has often been before the courts. Many cases have turned
upon the question of the existence or non-existence of a strike.
Strike clauses in contracts have given rise to some litigation in this
area.' Surety bonds with saving clauses releasing the surety in the event
the loss involved was caused by a strike have made such a determination
essential.2 And cases have arisen with respect to employee group insur-
ance,3 strike clauses in insurance policies,4 demurrage costs during delay
caused by strikes,' and the payment of union strike benefits.'
Social legislation of quite recent enactment lends new importance to
the problem of dearly analyzing the strike concept. Some states have
statutes which provide that no employer shall advertise for help while a
strike is in progress in his place of business without stating the fact in such
' 6z Ohio App. 54, z8 Ohio L. Abs. 653, 5 Ohio Op. 406 (1939).
'McLeod v. Genius, 3 Neb. 1, 47 N. 473 (i89o); Consolidated Coal Co. v.
Jones & A. Co., 232 Ill. 326, 83 N.E. 851 (59o8); and see Is A.L.R. oo4.
3Uden v. Schaefer, ixo Wash. 391, S8 Pac. 395, 11 A.L.R. iooi (x9zo).
1 Roehrig v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., 251 Ill. App. 434 (x9z9).
'Brous v. Imperial Ins. Co., z24 N.Y. Supp. 136, 130 Misc. 540 (19Z7) ,aff'd ZZ7
N.Y.S. 777, 223 App. Div. 713 (xz97).
'United States v. Russian Volunteer Fleet, 2z F. (zd) IS7 (19z7); Riviera Realty
Co. v. Ill. Surety Co., 165 App. Div. 114, 15o N.Y. Supp. 116 (1914); General Com-
mercial Co. v. Butterworth-Judson Corp., x98 App. Div. 799, 191 N. Y. Supp. 64 (192i).
' MARTIN, THE MODERN Lw OF LABOR UNIONS (1910), sec. 282.
